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Abstract: This essay critically analyzes Firoozeh Dumas’s humorous memoirs and
locates them in the multiple contexts of post-9/11 Muslim American responses to
Islamophobia, women’s humor, and Iranian American women’s life-writing. Drawing
upon philosophical, feminist, ethnic, and contemporary scientific theories of humor, and
the methods of literary criticism, it argues that Dumas employs the beneficial and
inclusive (not malign and exclusive) positive mode of humorous personal storytelling to
build connection through laughter via the emotional and cognitive shifts structurally
central to humor. Dumas addresses multiple audiences and engages in important (cross)
cultural work in a particularly fraught political and cultural climate of anti-Muslim
sentiment and tense Iran-U.S. relations.

Laughing With an Iranian American Woman:
Firoozeh Dumas’ Memoirs and the (Cross) Cultural Work of Humor
Since the turn of the twenty-first century, Iranian and Iranian American women’s
memoirs have earned deserved international acclaim.1 But not very many are funny, nor, if they
are, have scholars devoted attention to their deployment of humor as a serious tactic.2 This essay
closely examines Firoozeh Dumas’ distinctive use of humorous autobiographical storytelling to
explore how this Iranian American Muslim woman writer makes important (cross) cultural
interventions in the context of fraught relations between Iran and the U.S. in the aftermath of
9/11.3 Critical humor theory is the central lens through which I read Dumas’ writing, which I
locate in relation to the genres of post-9/11 Muslim comedy and Iranian American women’s
autobiographical writing. Drawing on theories of humor from contemporary psychology,
cognitive science, philosophy, and feminism, I argue that Dumas deploys a complex form of
benign inclusive humor, or humorous personal storytelling, to laugh with, not at people,4 to laugh
about an issue raised, and to instruct by building connection through laughter, not to malign,
depreciate or ridicule. Using the methods of literary analysis, I show how her writing engages in
two kinds of frequent shifts—shifts in the target of her humor, and conceptual shifts that make
visible and challenge readers’ assumptions—both, as I explain, designed to elicit an emotional
and cognitive response conducive to constructive relearning and rethinking.
In the urgent context of increased worldwide Islamophobia post-9/11, humor has become
a vital mode for Muslim writers, artists, and culture workers as a way to engage with power, to
re-educate, to push back, to interrupt and redirect dominant western /Eurocentric epistemologies
and cultural understandings. 5 Scholars across many disciplines are now beginning to pay
attention to the rise of Muslim comedy in Europe and America as a response to post-9/11
Islamophobia. Within Iranian or Middle Eastern studies however, humor has not been fully
recognized as more than mere entertainment, as a strategic mode of resistance or way to undo
tension or address dominant discourses. Muslim comedy in the west is not new, but it has taken a
distinctive turn since 2001, notes sociologist Mucahit Bilici, in particular because Muslims have
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often been cast by Westerners as lacking a sense of humor. Since “humor usually stands for
humanity” and “intolerance of humor … equated with cultural inferiority,” this putative lack is
taken to signify that Muslims are less than human.6 Such claims of Muslim inability to “take a
joke” fail, among other things, to recognize global and historic power inequalities, to distinguish
between the satiric debunking of power by the relatively disempowered and the hate speech or
racist ridicule enacted by those with relatively more power against those with less (such as
impoverished immigrants). A recent New York Times writer valuably differentiates the
“countercultural” humor of racial minority comedians like Richard Pryor who “pushed [up]
against” established forms of power, from the “punching down” humor of Charlie Hebdo
(criticized by “the dean of American satirical cartoonists,” Garry Trudeau, after the Paris
shootings) “for aiming its mockery at the vulnerable and the powerless” and thence re-enacting
“a pattern of racist and anti-Muslim bigotry.”7
Demonstrating that Muslims can produce and respond to humor thus becomes a way to
re-emphasize the humanity of Muslims as a stigmatized and dehumanized group. Muslim
filmmakers, stand-up comedians like Azhar Usman, Dean Obeidallah, Maz Jobrani, and Aamer
Rehman on television, social/entertainment media, and the Internet, and sitcoms like the
Canadian Little Mosque on the Prairie, have sought to change public discourses and perceptions
of Muslims in north America precisely through the use of humor. By establishing the humanness
of “the other,” Muslim American comedy turns “the world of Islamophobia upside down.”8 More
than pushback, the use of certain kinds of humor can yield additional educational benefits.
Laughter enables a shift from fear to reason and good feeling, “allowing us to see the world
through the eyes of the other.”9 Post-9/11 comic “Muslim cultural interpreters” in the West, like
Dumas, are uniquely positioned because they belong in and have “knowledge of both worlds:
ethnic and mainstream,” and as “field-guides to a contact zone” they can “‘leap’ from one side to
the other, practic[ing] simultaneously the two ways of seeing things.”10 This double vision, or
“simultaneous activation of two incompatible scripts” is also key, as I elaborate below, to the
cognitive dimension of humor, the “essence of humorous incongruity.”11 The public use of

2

humor by Muslims in the West post-9/11 has thus become a form of resistance and re-education,
a way to counter racialized stereotypes, and pose alternative ways of seeing. It can enable “codeswitching in the face of situations where the language of reason is overtaken by a wrong common
sense” because such humorists can understand the codes of both dominant mainstream and ethnic
or racialized and marginalized groups.12
I read Dumas’ writing as belonging to and participating in this emergent body of
contemporary Muslim ethnic American comedic cultural work, necessitating that we take her use
of humor as serious, not trivial. However, in comparison to Muslim male stand-up comedians’
work, I see Dumas’ work as distinctive for two other reasons. First, as a woman, she seems more
aware of (and addresses) gender inequalities than do most of her Muslim-American male
counterparts. Her work includes a subtle critique of sexist and patriarchal systems in both Iran
and America. Second, as a writer, she calls on different strategies of storytelling and audience
engagement than comedians who can also rely on bodily presence, gestures and facial expression.
Hence, in addition to situating Dumas as a (secular) Muslim, Iranian American female
memoirist, member of a multiply marked ethnic community in a deeply embattled context, I want
to emphasize the need to read her humor work intersectionally, to see how these multiple
dimensions of her identity and experience intersect, and how she works on several fronts to use
humor in constructive ways for community building.13 I thus also read her work via feminist
scholarship on gender and humor. In many patriarchal traditions, from China to Anglo-America,
women have been discouraged from laughing and inciting laughter, initiating or responding to
humor, because humor was (rightly) understood as subversive, debunking authority and
challenging hierarchy.14 “A smile, especially for a woman, is seen as an act of supplication,
whereas a laugh is often read as a challenge.”15 Across cultures, a woman’s laughter was also
associated with lack of control or sexual promiscuity, linked, via her open mouth, to her open
sexuality.16 Twentieth century western feminists, however, have also been caricatured as too
serious, “humorless,” “angry,” unable to laugh or take a joke, when they refuse to appease men
who try to bolster their power by using mockery.17 Of course, having a “sense of humor” has
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meant different things for men and women: that men produce jokes, women laugh in response.18
If women are castigated for both laughing and not laughing, this poses an inherently
contradictory, no-win situation for contemporary women humorists: how is a woman to position
herself if she laughs or attempts to evoke laughter? Like critical race theorists, many feminist
scholars note that humor can be an important strategy for feminists in any cultural tradition: as a
coping mechanism or cathartic alternative to feelings of outrage or helplessness, it can reduce
discourses of power to absurdity (relief and superiority theory); as a means of exposing
incongruity and contradiction, it can unmask and shift perspectives on forms of oppression
(incongruity theory); as a way to reach those otherwise not prepared to listen, it can build trust,
support, and community. Using laughter or humor does not mean that we do not take something
seriously; rather it can be an effective mode of communication, solidarity-building, and tool of
social activism. It also suggests that women who can laugh or initiate humor can distance
themselves from the ugliness (of sexism or misogyny) that they face. Women across cultures
have used humor and satire as a subversive, innovative tool of resistance and critique, from 18th c
British (Jane Austen, Maria Edgeworth, Fanny Burney) to 20th c American lesbian (June Arnold,
Rita Mae Brown) and postcolonial (Zadie Smith, Kiran Desai) writers.19
The use of humor always entails the exertion of power, especially for those who initiate
humor, whereas those who respond to humor may either join in the put-down of something else,
or laugh to appease the initiator of the joke. Studies show that in the contemporary American
workplace, “higher status” individuals are “much more likely to use humor” on lower-status
individuals like “junior staff” than vice versa to send a “critical or corrective message,” whereas
lower status individuals use humor less frequently in the presence of superiors, as selfdeprecation; hence “men tend to produce humor more than women, whereas women tend to
laugh more in response to men’s humor.”20 For women to initiate or create humor, then, and not
merely respond to it, is to claim higher status, to break deep-seated norms, and, argues Barreca, is
in itself a “feminist gesture.”21 “Making your own jokes is equivalent to taking control over your
life—and usually that means taking control away from someone else.”22 I locate Dumas’ work in
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this mode. But, as Barreca and Martin add, this retrieval of control does not necessitate ridicule
or self-elevation at others’ expense. Dumas’ humor acts not only as pushback and resistance; it
actively reaches out to be constructive. It uses inclusive humor to cement social bonds, disallow
easy targets, and build connections through laughter across difference.
Born in 1965 in Abadan, Iran, Firoozeh Dumas (originally Jayazeri) moved with her
family in 1972 to Whittier, California, returned to Tehran for two years, and moved back in 1976
to settle in southern California. After graduating from U.C. Berkeley, she married a Frenchman,
Francois Dumas, had three children, and began writing humorous vignettes about her life and
family. Consisting of these essays, her two memoirs Funny In Farsi: A Memoir of Growing Up
Iranian in America (2003) and Laughing Without an Accent: Adventures of a Global Citizen
(2008), have won popular acclaim in the U.S. and Iran. Funny in Farsi was a finalist for a PEN
Center USA award in 2004, for an Audie Award for best audiobook in 2005, and for the Thurber
Prize for American Humor in 2005 (a first for a Middle Eastern woman writer), on the bestseller
lists of the San Francisco Chronicle, the Los Angeles Times, and the New York Times, selected
for many Community Reads, assigned in many middle and high schools in the U.S., translated
into Persian and became a bestseller in Iran, where it won the Readers’ Choice Award.23 In the
U.S., Dumas has been invited to speak at libraries, schools, universities, churches, and Jewish
and Islamic community centers. Though not aspiring perhaps to the status of the “literary,” her
popular writing does important cultural work, as it aspires instead to reach a wider audience.24
Dumas’ memoirs offer the dual perspective of a girl growing up in two very different
cultures, a product of both, understanding, negotiating, and mediating between both. Written in
the context of threats of imminent war between the U.S. and Iran, her humorous stories about
herself and her family’s adventures learning to live in the U.S. explicitly seek to reduce tension,
to shift perspectives, to offer correctives, to humanize both Iranians and Americans for each
other, to build bridges. As a genre, memoir is often assumed to record individual private or
interior experience; how then can memoirs do cultural work? Theorists of life writing have long
recognized that autobiography—especially by women and people of color--is also relational
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(selves and identities are defined, experienced, lived, in relation to others, especially family and
community), and constitutes a valuable (though necessarily partial) window into the individual’s
historical moment and social, cultural world.25 Dumas’ stories present her experiences of late
twentieth-century Iran and America, offering unexpected angles on both from an insider-outsider
perspective of liminality, or double belonging.26
As an Iranian American writing in English, Dumas addresses multiple audiences:
mainstream Americans whose preconceptions she hopes to unsettle; Iranians reading her work in
translation who may also have negative preconceptions about Americans;27 Iranian Americans
like herself and her family, placed in-between, belonging to and vulnerable in both cultural
arenas; and, ultimately, a transnational Anglophone readership from the global south and north
that has access to international publishing circuits.28 A challenge for her as the producer of
humor then is to speak to all without alienating one group at the expense of another, to avoid
making any one group the target of the jokes, particularly Iranians in a global context of unequal
geopolitical power where Muslims are demonized and a history of hostility persists between Iran
and the U.S. Contemporary theorists of humor tell us that humor depends on an exchange among
three usually separate positions: the maker, the recipient, and the object or target (of the joke).29
As I show below, Dumas keeps shifting the locations of maker, recipient and objects of humor,
destabilizing those categories, making her readers, herself and her family share and switch those
roles in unexpected, unsignaled moments, so that no one occupies any one position alone. She
does not allow any reader to settle into a stable site of complacency or removed superior sense of
“self” in relation to an “other.” The audience, the putative recipient, can very quickly become the
object of the humor, as can the maker herself. At the same time, Dumas also casts herself as
recipient, for she laughs along, or reports herself laughing at stories she retells, even at her own
expense, just as her family can laugh at her or at American absurdities. In consequence, we are
all asked to laugh at ourselves, so that “we” becomes inclusive of maker, recipient, and target,
producing that “we” in the act of laughing together. Shared laughter itself builds camaraderie,
and can (at least temporarily) dissipate mistrust. One does not laugh with the enemy.

6

Dumas notes that she was very careful, when writing her first book, to avoid making her
family members appear ridiculous, to “not cross the line into anything embarrassing or
insulting:” “My goal was to have the subjects of my story laugh with me” (Laughing, 4). Instead
of laughing at a common enemy, she asks readers to laugh with her and her family, and then at
themselves, as if to say, ‘I may laugh about and with my parents, and ask you to laugh with me,
because guess what, they’re just like yours. Moreover, in reading what I’ve written, my parents
laugh too, about you and themselves, so they’re as capable of laughter as you are.’ An Iranian
magazine editor speculated on why Funny in Farsi was such a success with young people in Iran,
revealing also the anxieties and vulnerabilities of people in the global south to misreadings from
the global north: “‘Your stories are funny, but the way you write about nationalities—you don’t
make one bad and one good. We don’t hate Americans.’ He told me that he wanted Americans to
know this. ‘I’ll tell them that,’ I said” (Laughing, 10).
“Seeing Red,” a chapter in Laughing Without an Accent, offers a good example of
Dumas’ shifts. She begins by introducing her Jewish American high school friend Susan:
Aside from being very, very funny, Susan deserves credit for teaching me everything I know
about Jewish culture. Even though I already knew the nuts and bolts of Judaism, it was at
Susan’s house where I first tasted a latke, and realized that any religion where fried potatoes
is part of the tradition is good. I also … grasped the concept of “chutzpah,” a guiding force to
this day. (Laughing, 133)
This jovial tribute to female humor and friendship across religio-ethnic difference is already
significant for readers who know that the writer is a Muslim woman who was born in Iran and
grew up in California. While poking gentle fun at Firoozeh, her youthful (experiencing or
narrated) self, who knew less than she thought she did, Dumas (the older narrating self) likewise
challenges her readers even as she entertains. 30 In case they assume that cross-cultural learning is
a benefit unique to living in the United States, Dumas proceeds to something more unexpected:
When we lived in Iran, we had many Jewish friends. There were, and still are, more Jews
living in Iran than in any other country in the Middle East outside of Israel. It was no surprise
that everything Susan ever told me about Jewish culture felt familiar. (Laughing, 133)
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As she educates readers who might not know this about Iran, and upends presumptions of
inevitable animosity between Jews and Muslims, Dumas moves to yet another surprise:
One day Susan mentioned something about “a Jewish mother.” Even though I had heard the
term before, I asked for the exact meaning. “It’s all about guilt,” she said. As she started to
elaborate, complete with examples of Jewish mothers she had known, I was shocked. “That’s
not a Jewish mother,” I told her. “That’s my mother.” (Laughing, 133-34)
Her punch line delivers. It is important that when Firoozeh asks for the “exact meaning,” for
nuanced knowledge, she discovers similarity amid difference. By building up expectations and
then pleasantly thwarting them, Dumas establishes again, that, like Susan, she too is “very, very
funny,” and that the joke/surprise is precisely the discovery of commonality: both girls share a
familial culture of children guilt-tripped by mothers and an ability to cope with it through humor.
Yet Dumas is still not done. In this prologue to a chapter about how her mother continues
to guilt her in adulthood, she throws her readers another curve ball:
Growing up, I assumed all parents used guilt as one of the key pillars of parenting. My
mother was so stealthy that you never knew what hit you. It was like Andre Agassi’s serve.
You can know it’s coming toward you, but there’s still nothing you can do. Andre Agassi is,
coincidentally, half Iranian. It is entirely possible that his serve is nothing more than guilt
redirected. (Laughing, 134)
Through absurd analogy, she likens her mother’s emotional moves to Agassi’s serve, and reveals
the little-known fact that this world-famous tennis champion is part-Iranian. Again implicitly
challenging negative western stereotypes about Iranians, Dumas suggests that Agassi’s expertise
may come from lifetime practice at combating similar parent-induced guilt. Finally, to forestall
readers from concluding that this light-hearted preface--to her story about a bright red comforter
that Firoozeh’s mother buys for her--is designed to ridicule her family, Dumas pulls us up short
with an invitation to understand and empathize with an immigrant mother’s anxieties:
I realized years later that my mother’s use of guilt was her way to trying to corral me within
the confines of her world. Like many immigrants, she was afraid that the unknown road I was
taking would leave me with nothing but regrets. Even though her life had not always turned
out as she would have wanted, she wanted me to follow the same familiar road. At least then
my regrets would be similar to hers. (Laughing, 136)
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I parse carefully, piece by piece, this deceptively simple sample of Dumas’ humorous
autobiographical storytelling to identify and analyze some of its characteristic traits. First, note
the multiple destabilizing shifts. In terms of content, her opening is not concerned per se with
Muslims and Jews in Iran or America, or with Agassi, though it makes those references to build
an argument about diaspora, mothers, and similarities across differences. But in terms of style
and strategy, it exemplifies Dumas’ technique of continually shifting, after almost every
sentence, the ground beneath her readers’ feet, producing an incongruity, a surprise that
humorously exposes an assumption and invites rethinking and connection, not ridicule. At each
point, an implicit stereotype is exposed and overturned—that a Jewish and Muslim American girl
cannot be friends, that Iran is hostile to Jews, that Iranians are irretrievably other and cannot be
Western celebrities—without putting anyone down. Dumas, as narrator, includes her younger
naïve (narrated) self (Firoozeh) as also involved in the process of learning. Statements like
“[Susan taught] me everything I know about Jewish culture,” and “I was shocked,” highlight her
early naiveté. She does not exempt herself from the humor, but makes herself an example, as
learning and growing with and through humor.
Thus, second, Dumas’ humor is benign and inclusive: it has no single target against
which others are invited to unite via ridicule or putdown. Exclusionary forms of humor work by
uniting the maker of jokes and those laughing in presumed superiority against a targeted and
ridiculed other. However, Dumas’ humor eschews this malign form. It keeps shifting its target,
so that no one is excluded from the joke. Benign humor has the effect of including all, as all are
invited to join in the laughter, to laugh at themselves (as Dumas laughs at herself) as they
discover their own misconceptions, and are disallowed from simply laughing at another. In this
example, Dumas’ target shifts from herself, to her readers, to her mother, and back to herself, as
she wryly concludes with a self-ironic belated recognition that her immigrant mother’s “use of
guilt” arose from anxiety and love, a poignant desire to minimize instability for her children in a
world that she feared would only disappoint, and to “corral” them into shared experiences so that
their “regrets” would at least be familiar. Dumas’ conclusion is thus complex, for its humor is
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directed at first at her mother but then at herself for not initially understanding her mother, and it
invites its readers to share in that progressive shift towards understanding and (re)learning.
Third, I want to note Dumas’ deliberate lightness of tone and use of absurd
understatement and overstatement, comic and ironic mismatching rhetoric (all forms of
incongruity), which can be misread. If read straight, for instance, the statement that she “realized
that any religion where fried potatoes is part of the tradition is good,” could be regarded as
trivializing religious, political or ethnic difference, where the Muslim American girl overcomes
her wariness of Jewishness merely because she loves the food. But Dumas’ writing is tongue-incheek. It is an effort to counter religious prejudice, but from a place that highlights the absurdity
of the assumption that an entire religion or religious group is suspect. It renders comic the notion
that any religion is not “good” by offsetting it against the incongruous absurdity of a teenager’s
joy in “fried potatoes.” Moreover, it overturns that assumption without mockery or derision.
As autobiographical writing, Dumas’ work clearly contributes to the growing “Iranian
[and Iranian American] women’s memoir phenomenon.”31 While first generation memoirs like
Persepolis and Reading Lolita were “still invested in the depiction of a national story and the
possibility of a return to power in the home country,” second generation memoirs like Azadeh
Moaveni’s Lipstick Jihad (2005) and Roya Hakakian’s Journey from the Land of No (2004) are
“no longer intended exclusively to educate Americans about Iran; they are equally invested in
teaching themselves and one another about diaspora”.32 Dumas, as a one and half generation
Iranian American, does both, with the additional distinctive use of humor: she elucidates
experiences of middle-class Iranians in the U.S. as well as in pre-revolutionary Iran. Moreover,
she attempts to mediate in multiple directions, not only addressing Iranian Americans like
herself, but also seeking to educate American and Iranian readers about each other, to upend
expectations and dispel negative preconceptions on both sides, while maintaining an awareness
that both sides are not equal, that Americans carry greater responsibility because of their greater
global dominance and cultural and political power, and because far more Iranians have become
Americans than the converse. To all readers she emphasizes their common ground or “shared
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humanity”.33 Dumas thus presents herself explicitly as a cultural mediator, building bridges
across chasms of negative representation.
As an Iranian American writer, Dumas inevitably faces a challenge, given “the context of
the stereotyping and vilification to which Iranians have been subjected in moments of heightened
confrontation between the United States and Iran,” after the 1953 CIA backed ousting of Iran’s
democratically elected nationalist prime minister Mossadegh in support of the Shah to control
Iran’s oil industry, the 1979 revolution and hostage crisis, and the post-9/11 “war on terror” and
designation of Iran as the “axis of evil”.34 So “what is the best manner in which to combat the
demonization of Iranians by the West and the demonization of the West by Iran?” asks a critic, to
argue that literature can help break down cultural and political dichotomies.35 While Dumas’
autobiographical writing does not claim to represent or speak for all Iranians or Muslims in
America (or Iran), it does push back against these negative representations that have only
intensified in the aftermath of 9/11 and ensuing tensions in Iran-U.S. relations.
Scholars who have attended to Dumas’ work tend to be dismissive, perhaps because they
misapprehend her use of humor. Negar Mottahedeh, for instance, criticizes Dumas for trivializing
the complexities of world politics when Dumas writes, “I believe peace in the Middle East could
be achieved if the various leaders held their discussions in front of a giant bowl of Persian ice
cream, each leader with his own silver spoon. Political differences would melt with every
mouthful.”36 Amy Motlagh softens Mottahedeh’s critique but does not contest her premise that
Dumas’ “clumsy attempt to translate Iranian culture into humorous terms comprehensible to
Americans … trivializes Iran’s plight in the modern world.”37 I would argue, however, that such
responses overlook the formal, rhetorical and discursive strategies of Dumas’ humor: irony,
comic exaggeration, absurdism. Clearly, Dumas is not seriously proposing food as a solution to
political conflict. Ironic humor uses indirection; it depends on the relation between the said and
unsaid.38 I read Dumas here as doing several things at once. In detailing her family’s hybrid
celebration of American Thanksgiving with Iranian food, she fully celebrates Iranian culture and
Iranians’ capacity to adapt and survive in adverse circumstances abroad; she reminds all readers,
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not only Americans, that political differences notwithstanding, food can provide an occasion to
bring people together, to recall their shared humanity and attempt to work out differences with
good will; and she uses the rhetoric of exaggeration, while recognizing differences, to suggest
that sharing what we can share (food, laughter), building trust, breaking bread together, at the
same table, might be a way to mitigate them. Rhetorically, her comment attempts to draw readers
together by its evocation of both Iranian food and humor.
Mottahedeh also criticizes Dumas for her celebration of American freedoms, including
“the right to vote” and “the abundance of free samples available throughout this great land.”39
But again, she neglects the irony of Dumas’ tone, as well as Dumas’ pointed reminder of gender
inequality. Unlike her mother, who had to give up her dream of being a doctor to marry
Firoozeh’s father in Iran, Firoozeh can pursue an education and financial independence in
America. “I always share gratitude for being able to pursue my hopes and dreams, despite being
female. My relatives and I are proud to be Iranian, but we also give tremendous thanks for our
lives in America, a nation where freedom reigns” (Funny, 75). This tribute to America may
sound naive, but it does recognize the reality of certain freedoms, especially for women,
compared to Iran.40 Moreover, if we note the context, it becomes apparent that these comments
are only the set-up for a chapter that is much more critical of America: Dumas quickly qualifies
that praise of American “freedom” as she critiques the phrase “the land of the free” when she
applies it ironically to putative American largesse (75). Far from celebrating, in this chapter
Dumas satirizes the American capitalist economy that hands out seemingly “free” samples to
entice consumers to buy more, and gently critiques her parents for falling for that seduction.
Perhaps one difficulty that Dumas faces is that (especially among academic critics),
humor, or the laughter it may evoke, is often regarded as frivolous, frothy, unworthy of serious
attention, a sign that the author cannot be serious.41 In traditional western aesthetics, the comic
itself, as a form, was considered lesser than the tragic or the sublime.42 Likewise, in Persian,
Arabic and Turkish literary traditions, hazl, humorous or comical satire, was considered inferior
to hajv, sheer invective.43 However, as humor theorists from Plato to Bakhtin to contemporary

12

psychologists and anthropologists argue, we need to take humor seriously, to understand its
social, psychic, cultural and political dimensions, to see how it can do valuable cultural work.
Indeed, the classical Persian tradition recognized that “behind the lightness of its form” hazl can
conceal jedd, serious intent.44 A literary scholar puts it forcefully: “one of the most insidious
fallacies is the belief that laughter is trivial. The function of laughter is to make things trivial—
and thus gain mastery over whatever threatens to overwhelm us. Laughter is a serious matter. …
[it] is a strategy of self-defence that enables us to face sources of fear or pain.”45 “Humor is
inextricably linked with power,” and can be used both to reinforce and to challenge dominance
and power; the “marginal humor [of those in socially disadvantaged positions] may empower the
powerless, may invert and subvert the status quo.”46 And humor can make critique more effective
by making it more palatable. Before turning to a closer examination of Dumas’ work, then, I
want to explain the foundational framework for my analysis by offering a brief overview of
theories of humor that I find most useful for her work.
Reading Dumas via Theories of Humor
The capacity to laugh has long been considered a defining feature of the human species.
Aristotle named us animal ridens (the creature who laughs).47 Contemporary psychologists and
anthropologists agree that “humor and laughter are a universal aspect of human experience,
occurring in all cultures … throughout the world,” though “different cultures have their own
norms concerning the suitable subject matter of humor and the types of situations in which
laughter is considered appropriate.”48 While particular forms of humor are culturally and
historically specific--hence the untranslatability of specific instances of humor—the human
psychology and physiology of humor and laughter seem universal. Since I draw mostly on
theories of humor developed by western scholars—though ranging in place and time—that
pertain to human psychology in general, some may wonder to what extent they are applicable to
Dumas’ humor. First, these theories claim applicability to all humans across cultural and
historical differences and are not limited to western forms of humor; second, since Dumas writes
in English, hence assuming a global Anglophone readership, this theoretical framework seems
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relevant. This does not preclude, of course, affiliations between her culturally hybrid humor and
Iranian traditions of humor, though exploring those lies beyond the scope of this essay.49
Three influential philosophical theories have dominated discussions of humor. (To be
clear about terminology: humor is understood as “action, speech or writing” that elicits laughter
or amusement, or, “the quality of being amusing, comical” (OED); laughter, as a bodily response
to humor that usually expresses and evokes pleasure; amusement as a mental or psychological
state.50) First, the Superiority Theory originated with the ancient Greeks, who saw all humor as
ridicule or mockery, a way to establish superiority over those laughed at, or to subvert righteous
authority and hierarchy; Plato banned humor from the Republic for being disrespectful and
anarchic.51 This view of humor as exerting superiority or challenging authority extends to
Hebrew, Middle Eastern, Russian and Asian traditions. In the Old Testament, Abraham’s wife
Sarah got in trouble with God for laughing when told that she would have a child in her old age,
because her laughter was read as skepticism of divine power; Christ reportedly never laughed,
nor in Christian medieval belief, did angels; Sun-tzu tells the story of a Chinese king who
responded to the laughter of his wives by beheading them.52 Mikhail Bakhtin’s notion of
carnivalesque humor, though valorized positively, likewise sees laughter as a tool by the
disempowered to diminish the power of the dominant, to bring low the pretensions of the high.53
Second, the Relief Theory suggests that humor enables a release of psychic energies
otherwise deployed in restraining the primal impulses and emotions like hostility, anger, or sexual
desire; laughter saves energy otherwise spent on self-control. For Freud, “humor is a means to
circumvent social taboos against both aggression and sexuality. … Laughter serves as a hydraulic
safety valve for the unconscious.”54 Hence laughter is also a “key to the unconscious,” because it
allows us to “tap buried sources of pleasure.”55 The third, Incongruity Theory, proposes that humor
is a cognitive phenomenon: we find something funny when we experience the incongruous, a
mismatch between expectation and reality. Kant argued that “laughter is a reaction to the absurd,
that which defies rational understanding”; Schopenhauer that laughter is evoked by paradox, the
“pleasure of surprise.”56 Philosopher John Morreall defines humor as occasioned by a “conceptual
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shift;” indeed the “essence of humor,” writes Martin, is “the simultaneous activation of two
contradictory perceptions” or “bisociation,” when “two self-consistent but normally incompatible or
disparate frames of reference,” “both X and not-X,” are seen or brought together.57
These theories, however, do not explicitly distinguish between malign and benign uses of
humor, though they can explain both. Citing Henri Bergson, behavioral neuroscientist Provine also
makes explicit the inherently social dimension of laughter, which can only occur in “the context of a
group.”58 Hence all three theories can explain how humor is linked with power, or involves an
assertion of power by both the socially empowered and disempowered. The Superiority Theory
explains the negative humor of racist or sexist jokes as a way to assert power, to put down (or keep
down) those with less power, where those inciting laughter and those laughing together assert
superiority over those laughed at, to reaffirm social hierarchies. But all humor does not involve
aggression or scorn.59 The superiority theory can also explain the pushback humor of the socially
marginalized. Positive humor like Dumas’ seeks not to exert superiority over others, but rather, to
assert a refusal to be cowed or vanquished (by racism, Islamophobia, anti-Iranian sentiment, or
relative disempowerment). It works like “deathbed” humor: by making a joke of what threatens us,
we refuse to succumb to the threat. Psychologically, it becomes a way to reassert power, to maintain
a sense of control in the face of prejudice or persecution. “The superiority view can provide a
theoretical basis for conceptualizing humor as a way of coping with stress and adversity. If humor is
a way of playfully asserting a sense of victory over the people and situations that threaten us,
mastery over our oppressors, and liberation from life’s constraints, then … it can be an important
way of maintaining our self-esteem and mental sanity in the face of adversity.”60
Likewise, if Relief Theory explains negative humor as a way for the powerful to evade
social restraints (or repression) and say the otherwise unsayable, it also explains how humor like
Dumas’ can work positively for those disempowered (both for herself as a writer and producer of
humor and for her Iranian American readers). It can bring relief as an emotionally cathartic or
coping mechanism to laugh away the pain, to restore a sense of self-esteem and control. Laughter
brings relief from a sense of oppressiveness, even if it cannot solve the problem. In fact, argues,
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Morreall, comedy enables emotional disengagement and flexible thinking and thereby promotes
alternative forms of problem-solving.61 Finally, Incongruity Theory, understood as a cognitive,
conceptual shift, explains how humor like Dumas’ can also be educational: by making explicit the
absurdity of powerful assumptions, preconceptions, or biases, it can provoke laughter at oneself for
holding them, and can promote the rethinking of those assumptions (say among white American
readers). Humor depends on and enables a shift in ways of seeing: “applying humor to a situation is
like applying lateral thinking—it allows you to see things from a new angle.”62
Contemporary science research (from psychology to behavioral neuroscience) confirms and
extends these philosophical approaches to humor. Psychologist Rod Martin argues for an integrated
approach to humor studies, to emphasize the multifacetedness and multifunctionality of humor and
to reassert its combined cognitive, emotional and social dimensions:
Humor can be a method of enhancing social cohesion within an in-group, but it can also be a
way of excluding individuals from an out-group. It can be a means of reducing but also
reinforcing status differences among people, expressing agreement and sociability but also
disagreement and aggression, facilitating cooperation as well as resistance, and
strengthening solidarity or undermining power and status. Thus, while originating in social
play, humor has evolved in humans as a universal mode of communication and social
influence with a variety of functions.63
Rather than see humor as only aggressive, or only cognitive, or only relief-giving, Martin
emphasizes how different forms of humor can incorporate varying degrees of all these as well as the
social (positive and negative) functions of communication and exertion of power. These theories
explain what is operative in all the examples I analyze below, though to avoid repetition, I will not
name them each time. In every case, Dumas’ humorous anecdotes and remarks demonstrate: (i) the
exertion or reassertion of control (superiority over that which threatens); the production of relief
from tension; and most importantly, through the surprise of incongruity, the production of an
opportunity to learn or relearn, to rethink prejudice or misconception. Moreover, as the examples
below show, Dumas’ humor also enacts a form of feminist empowerment and community building.
Based on empirical studies, Martin identifies three broad categories of humor: “jokes, or
prepackaged humorous anecdotes that people memorize and pass on to each other,” involving a
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setup and punch-line; “spontaneous conversational humor, created intentionally by individuals… in
social interaction;” and “accidental or unintentional humor” (11). Whereas most empirical studies of
humor in labs focused on jokes, he found in a study of subjects’ daily logs that only “11% of daily
laughter occurred in response to jokes,” 17% to the media, and 72% in spontaneous social
interactions that occur within specific social contexts (12). Moreover, he found significant gender
differences in the use of these categories: “joke-telling tends to be relatively more characteristic of
male humor, whereas women are more likely to relate humorous personal anecdotes” (147).64
Martin’s findings illuminate key aspects of Dumas’ storytelling: its sociality and gendered
form (the autobiographical story). Instead of prepackaged jokes or one-liners, Dumas uses the form
of the humorous personal anecdote to describe her own context-specific interactions and
conversations with others, as if enacting a second level of humorous social conversation with her
readers. This has the powerful effect of creating the sociality or social interaction that Martin
describes--between author and readers—as readers share in her stories and are invited into the world
she (re)creates. Her writing clearly belongs in the category of intentional spontaneous
conversational and gendered humor. (This is not to say that men cannot use humorous storytelling
for similar purposes, but that women predominantly do.) By using the form of the personal
anecdote, Dumas deploys an inclusive, non-aggressive, social bonding mode of humor.
Rod Martin identifies three psychological functions and outcomes of humor: (i) “cognitive
and social benefits of the positive emotion of mirth” (which induce better learning and memory,
more creative problem-solving, more social responsibility and prosocial behaviors such as
helpfulness and generosity”); (ii) “social communication and influence” (which enable forms of
indirect communication that can either “strengthen relationships, smooth over conflicts, and build
cohesiveness” or “ostracize, humiliate, or manipulate”); (iii) “tension relief and coping” (which
“provides a way for an individual to shift perspective on a stressful situation” and “may have a
physiological benefit of speeding recovery from cardiovascular effects of negative stress-related
emotions” that “can contribute to mental health” (Martin, 15-20). Dumas’ writing, as we see below,
demonstrates all these benign functions of humor. First, cognitively, it attempts to enable positive
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re-cognition of otherness (we learn better with laughter); second, as social communication and
influence, it seeks to build cohesiveness across cultural and national differences through shared
humor, recognition of commonality, and good feeling (we connect over laughter); third, as tension
relief, it enables both a form of therapeutic coping for herself as well as for diverse readers,
restoring self-esteem and control (we feel better after laughter).
The Artful Arc of Funny in Farsi
Close reading has been identified as a distinctive analytical method of literary criticism
because it allows for the careful, nuanced analysis of layers of meaning and the unpacking or
opening up of multiple coexistent meanings. Though once associated with the exclusion of
historical and social contexts, informed close reading can actually enhance culturally and
politically oriented textual approaches with greater attention to the unexpected and unique, to
textual detail and twists of language and rhetoric, to discover greater subtlety and complexity in a
text than via a pre-set grid.65 In what follows, I do not just explain what is funny, but, to use the
distinction between locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary acts of language, I emphasize
what is enacted, or performed by Dumas’ acts of humor.66 Hence, by reading closely particular
instances, and attending to the trajectory of each book, I examine how Dumas establishes trust
and inclusivity with her readers through laughter in order to carve herself a space for critique, and
how she addresses multiple audiences to do cultural and cross-cultural work.
The vignettes in Funny in Farsi are arranged in rough chronological order, from
Firoozeh’s arrival in Whittier, California in 1972, her early school experiences, adolescence, to
marriage and adulthood, with occasional flashbacks to her childhood or family history in Iran.
But they also have another underlying design. Dumas starts with seemingly self-deprecating,
innocuous accounts of herself and her family adjusting to their new lives as immigrants, making
comical mistakes, finding kindness among strangers. She does not play the fool (as some
minority comedians have done) to appease or ingratiate herself or her community with a
dominant cultural readership, but uses these opening vignettes to establish her credibility, her
verbal dexterity, her warmly affectionate if irreverent ribbing of her parents, to build her readers’
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trust before she makes more pointed criticisms. She begins with an account of her first day at
elementary school, the kindness of her American second grade teacher who welcomed her and
her mother by “incorporating [them both] into the day’s lesson” (6), but didn’t realize that
Firoozeh’s mother’s inability to find Iran on the world map was due to her lack not only of
English, but also “of world geography” (6).67 Young Firoozeh’s mortification and fear of being
thought stupid by her new classmates is both described and counteracted by (older) Dumas who
demonstrates her retrospective distance from and control over those feelings through her use of
humor (exerting both superiority over them and relief). In so doing, Dumas also makes visible
the systemic gendered disadvantages that underlay her mother’s limited education in Iran despite
her class status. Dumas combines sympathy for her mother with a critical delineation of her
father’s male privilege as she describes how he became an engineer and a Fulbright scholar who
spent a year at Princeton, and could then return to pick her “fair-skinned” seventeen-year-old
mother, who had to give up her dreams of a career for an arranged marriage (5).
Yet throughout, Dumas’ tone remains light and jovial, as she reaches out to readers in
dominant American culture. Her father’s English, too, in those early years, was not much help to
the immigrant family. “He was to be our own private Rosetta stone” upon arrival, she quips, but
“thanks to [his] translations, we stayed away from hot dogs, catfish, and hush puppies, and no
amount of caviar in the sea would have convinced us to try mud pie” (8-9). Having spent his time
in America in the library or with engineering professors, her father, she notes, “As long as the
conversation was limited to vectors, surface tension, and fluid mechanics, … was Fred Astaire
with words. But one step outside the scintillating world of petroleum engineering and he had two
left tongues” (9). She thus demonstrates her own adept command of English, popular culture,
intellectual history, and the twin arts of humorous understatement and hyperbole. Dumas’ parents
are not set up as targets of humor; even as it humanizes them, each anecdote emphasizes their
courage and resilience in coping with migration and resettlement. Moreover, she quickly shifts
targets to include her younger self and her readers in the humor, and demonstrates how laughter
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becomes a resource for her immigrant family to help cope with and rise above embarrassments
and humiliations.
“Save Me, Mickey,” describes how seven-year-old Firoozeh gets lost in Disneyland.
Dumas presents her younger self as both comical (fascinated by the possibility of talking to
Mickey Mouse, Firoozeh loses track of her family) and precociously witty. She begins with a wry
account of Dumas’ father’s idolization of Walt Disney (“For him, ‘Pirates of the Caribbean’
represents the pinnacle of man’s creative achievement” not “computers, the Concorde or knee
replacement surgery,” (18)). Then she describes his fear of American gun violence: “One of my
father’s biggest fears in moving to America was child kidnappings. Our hometown, Abadan, was
about as safe a place as one could hope for. We knew all the neighbors, everyone looked out for
everyone’s kids, and there was basically no crime other than petty theft. Whenever my relatives
came to visit us in America, they would watch the evening news a few times, and then refuse to
leave the house. … In Iran, citizens do not have access to guns, so we do not have the types of
crimes that so often lead to murders in America” (18-19). Having allayed American readers’
potential suspicions of an Iranian man by establishing her father’s eagerness to assimilate, his
(uncritical) adoration of Disney, and his repeat excursions with family and friends to Disneyland,
Dumas describes the relative safety of daily life in Iran compared to the U.S., and, with an
implicit critique of the Second Amendment, emphasizes her immigrant father’s anxiety about his
children’s safety in America, and his insistence that they seek police help if needed. Careful as
yet to appeal to a range of readers, she suggests that Iranian visitors’ fears may be similarly
exaggerated by showing how dominant media representations distort both nations.
But this vignette is designed to do more (cross) cultural work. As Dumas describes how
she was escorted to the Lost and Found by a Disney employee and safely returned to her parents,
she includes a biting account of well-meaning white American ignorance and condescension to
racial(ized) others. The comforting ladies at the Lost and Found Center have no idea where Iran
is, and compliment the teary Firoozeh on her English. When another lost child arrives screaming
and appears to speak no English, they assume she must know him. “I knew what was coming. ‘Is
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that boy from your country?’ she asked me. ‘Why yes, I wanted to tell her. ‘In my country,
which I own, this is National Lose Your Child at Disneyland Day’” (20). Firoozeh’s smart, sassy,
imagined response makes visible, and contrasts with, the adult’s foolishness, implicitly
implicating, amusing, and educating her American readers about their own assumptions.
This mode of instruction with amusement continues in the chapter “With a Little Help
from My Friends.” Alluding with her ironic, playful title to the Beatles song, establishing her
own conversance with Western popular culture, Dumas begins with the kindness and ignorance
of Americans (about Iran) in 1972: “I was lucky to have come to America years before the
political upheaval in Iran. The Americans we encountered were kind and curious, unafraid to ask
questions and willing to listen. As soon as I spoke enough English to communicate, I found
myself interviewed nonstop by children and adults alike. My life became one long-running Oprah
show, minus the free luxury accommodations in Chicago, and Oprah” (31). She uses humorous
analogy (and incongruity) to describe the Americans who had never heard of Iran and could not
even locate it in Asia, and make visible differences in global power between Iran and America:
“We had always known that ours is a small country and that America is very big. But even as a
seven-year-old, I was surprised that so many Americans had never noticed us on the map.
Perhaps it’s like driving a Yugo and realizing that the eighteen-wheeler can’t see you” (32).
Dumas attributes this differential in geographic knowledge to differences in educational systems.
“In [pre-Revolutionary] Iran, geography [was] a requirement in every grade … In first grade
geography, I had to learn the shape of Iran and the location of its capital, Tehran. I had to
memorize that we shared borders with Turkey, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, and the USSR. I also
knew that I lived on the continent of Asia” (32). Under the guise of humor, she slips in that
requisite geography lesson for American readers, and suggests how power differentials are linked
to differences in knowledge, how Americans, unlike Third World peoples, can afford to be
insular.
Even in 1972, American children, she reports, were prone to ask questions that revealed
Orientalist preconceptions. Uncurious about geography or history, they asked her about camels.
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“How many did we own back home? What did we feed them? Was it a bumpy ride? I always
disappointed them by admitting that I had never seen a camel in my entire life. And as far as a
ride goes, our Chevrolet was rather smooth. They reacted as if I had told them that there really
was a person in the Mickey Mouse costume” (32). Dumas’ punch line is funny because it uses a
surprise/incongruous analogy to make the point that her audience has been harboring puerile
illusions (adults know that there really is a person inside the Disney costume; only children need
to maintain that illusion). Likewise, the belief that Iranians ride on camels, do not have cars, and
live in a timeless premodernity, tells us more about the primitivist, Orientalist desire to believe,
to consider oneself superior, and about those who hold such beliefs (and their geopolitical
location and power) than about those about whom such beliefs are held.
While critiquing this American mixture of ignorance and arrogance, Dumas’ artful humor
is not done. Again, it shifts ground. American readers who are invited to laugh at children’s
questions are implicated when Dumas reveals that adults were no exception, asking about
“electricity, tents, and the Sahara” and were similarly disappointed to learn that “we had
electricity, that we did not own a tent, and that the Sahara was on another continent” (32). But
again, Dumas alleviates these revelations by expanding the scope of her humor to include her
father, whose response she casts as both understandable (countering Orientalism) and excessive:
“Intent to remedy the image of our homeland as backward, my father took it upon himself to
enlighten Americans whenever possible. Any unsuspecting American who asked my father
received, as a bonus, a lecture on the successful history of the petroleum industry in Iran. As my
father droned on, I watched the faces of these kind Americans, who were undoubtedly making
mental notes never to talk to a foreigner again” (32-33). While Dumas’ humorous retelling gently
ribs her father’s earnestness, she also makes clear that her father’s concern was legitimate. A
neighbor who had seen Lawrence of Arabia revealed that these inquiries were based on the
assumption that Iranians are Arabs. “My father explained that Iranians are an Indo-European
people; we are not Arabs. We do however, have two things in common with Saudi Arabia, he
continued: ‘Islam and petroleum.’ ‘Now I won’t bore you with religion,’ he said, ‘but let me tell
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you about the petroleum industry’” (33). Again, her humor leavens without mitigating her points;
indeed, it enables their reception. It excludes none, inviting all to laugh at themselves, singling
out neither Americans nor Iranians nor her father as targets of humor, inducing laughter to dispel
tension, building good will to explain and contextualize the larger inequalities and socio-political
or structural reasons for these misconceptions.
As a child, she notes, though she got tired of the questions, “I never punched anybody
with my fists; I used words” (33). Young Firoozeh learned to deploy pointed wit and her
intermediary’s knowledge of both cultural contexts to fight back, to resist the aggressive bullying
humor that exerted superiority on the playground: “Often kids tried to be funny by chanting, ‘I
ran to I-ran, I ran to I-ran.’ The correct pronunciation, I always informed them, is ‘Ee-rahn.’ ‘I
ran’ is a sentence, I told them, as in ‘I ran away from my geography lesson’” (34). As an adult,
she builds on these skills to invite reflection and understanding via the literary art once defined
by the poet Philip Sidney as the combination of instruction with delight.
In this illustrative chapter, with its twists and turns, Dumas does not merely portray
American ignorance and her family’s efforts to counter it, but makes a more complicated point.
“Almost every person who asked us a question asked with kindness,” she notes. “Questions were
often followed by suggestions of places to visit in California. At school, the same children who
inquired about camels also shared their food with me” (34). Dumas describes how Firoozeh was
looked after, especially around American rituals: friends’ mothers made cupcakes for her
classroom snacks, brought her Halloween costumes so that she would not feel left out, taught her
to ride a bike, and when her family were returning to Iran in 1974, showered her with “an
avalanche of kindness” and slumber parties (36). Even without English, Firoozeh’s mother
understood that the crossing guard’s smiles meant she was looking out for her daughter. “Even
though I had been the beneficiary of all the attention, my mother, watching silently from a
distance, had also felt the warmth of generosity and kindness. It was hard to leave” (36). I read
Dumas here not as appeasing her American readers, but as making a complicated maneuver.
Without diminishing her earlier critique, Dumas reassures her American readers that goodwill
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and humane interaction were possible then, and now. Her long list of examples also dispels
misconceptions about Americans on the part of her Iranian readers. And finally, Dumas ends
with another twist. She historicizes this moment as pre-1979, educating Americans, Iranians, and
Iranian Americans about the changes that followed that critical date:
When my parents and I get together today, … we remember the kindness more than ever,
knowing that our relatives who immigrated to this country after the Iranian Revolution
did not encounter the same America. They saw Americans who had bumper stickers on
their cars that read ‘Iranians: Go Home’ or ‘We Play Cowboys and Iranians.’ The
Americans they met rarely invited them to their houses. These Americans felt that they
knew all about Iran and its people, and they had no questions, just opinions. My relatives
did not think Americans were very kind. (36)
Upending expectation upon expectation, Dumas disallows any one set of readers to settle into
complacency or to feel superiority over others. She assures her Iranian readers that Americans
were kind, kinder in 1972 than after 1979—and hints to her American readers that that former
kindness is recoverable.
Concerned about one-sided Western media representations of the Middle East, especially
post-9/11, Dumas strives to serve as cross-cultural ambassador, to foster mutual acceptance.68
Her humor is thus carefully nuanced and controlled, designed to build connection, not to alienate,
so that her points can be heard. In a later chapter, “I-raynians Need Not Apply,” she describes the
prejudice and hostility that her family experienced after 1979 (they returned and settled in the
U.S. in 1976), how her father was laid off and could not find another job, how the media vilified
Iranians, how all Iranians were blamed for the hostage takers, how “crimes against Iranians
increased” (117).69 Iranians are asked to understand angry American responses to the hostage
crisis, and Americans to understand the consequences (for families like hers) of those responses.
But Dumas does not simply seek to “balance” perspectives in an unbalanced situation.
Americans, given their relatively greater global power, are asked to take more responsibility; it is
their continuing preconceptions that her work--written in English--primarily addresses.
On several occasions in Funny in Farsi Dumas also makes herself the target of laughter to
preempt being perceived as placing herself in a position of superiority over others, or

24

encouraging readers to laugh at those she describes. However, she invites her readers to laugh
with (not at) her (or her younger self) and demonstrates her own capacity to laugh both at herself
and at the situation to rise above the difficulties she describes. Humor thus allows Dumas to
show how she copes (through relief) with racially charged problems or microaggressions. Dumas
does not engage in the kind of self-putdowns that some comedians from non-dominant groups
have used to win a mainstream audience, and that reconfirm stereotypes about that group.
Instead, she describes a range of situations that any newcomer might experience in a new
environment, inviting diverse readers to relate or understand, to challenge stereotypes, and via
humor, to switch perspectives out of habituated modes of perception. Often she presents her
childhood or teenage self in ludicrous moments: her first time at a summer camp, where she
spent two weeks refusing to bathe or participate in outdoor activities because of the lack of
private shower facilities (42-49); her hopeless ineptitude learning to swim despite her family’s
drastic efforts to teach her (68-73). Each episode offers an example of her quick shifting moves,
so that no one remains the target of humor for long, and each absurd event or action is
contextualized to enlist imaginative sympathy, especially through the use of the first pronoun “I,”
where the teller manifests her willingness to expose herself and her family with the expectation
(and exemplary demonstration) of generosity.
In “The ‘F Word,’” for instance, she describes the trouble Iranian parents unwittingly
caused their children by giving them names unpronounceable in America. “My cousin’s name,
Farbod, means ‘Greatness.’ When he moved to America, all the kids called him ‘Farthead.’ My
brother Farshid (‘He Who Enlightens’) became ‘Fartshit.’ The name of my friend Neggar means
‘Beloved’ although it can be more accurately translated as ‘She Whose Name Almost Incites
Riots’” (62). Careful to provide cultural/linguistic context, she explains what each name means
in Persian, and how it is subjected to transmutation in American English. That these epithets are
enabled by a dominant racist environment where American children can torment Iranian ones is
part of her point. But the humor for Dumas’ readers is created from the incongruity of the two
systems, not by making either one a butt of ridicule. She describes her own vulnerability as a
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twelve-year-old: “My name, Firoozeh, chosen by my mother, means ‘Turquoise’ in Persian. In
America it means ‘Unpronounceable’ or ‘I’m Not Going to Talk to you Because I Cannot
Possibly Learn Your Name and I Just Don’t Want to Have to Ask you Again…” (63). Despite
dissuasion from her older brothers, Firoozeh changed her name to Julie, only to discover that her
new neighbor was also called Julie. Yet while Dumas makes fun of her younger self for desiring
assimilation to the dominant culture, she elicits understanding of the pressures that an immigrant
teenager undergoes, showing also how malign, racist humor can hurt. She seeks relief from the
mortifying memory via laughter, and shows she has risen above it by retelling it as a funny story.
Dumas’ humor also enables her to present, for her American readers, a hearable critique
of broader American culture and prejudices. She reports how, after the Iranian Revolution, her
newly adopted name (Julie) and accent-less English suddenly allowed her to hear racist remarks
about Iranians because she was assumed to be American, or how, after college, when she readopted her real name, she could not get interviews until she returned to ‘Julie’ on her resume
(65). (Nadine Naber confirms how, after 9/11, Muslim sounding names like Mohammed have
functioned in association with “particular nations of origin” as “signifiers of an imagined
Arab/Middle Eastern/Muslim enemy,” and provoked acts of racism (278).) It would be tempting,
perhaps, to use sarcasm or more bite to excoriate this racism. But doing so would lose her
American readers. Dumas’ tactic throughout instead is to win empathy by evoking laughter.
Dumas’ conclusion reveals another destabilizing shift, as she describes a scene in a
doctor’s waiting room:
As I waited patiently, the receptionist called out, ‘Fritzy, Fritzy!’ Everyone looked
around, but no one stood up. Usually, if I’m waiting to be called by someone who doesn’t
know me, I will respond to just about any name starting with an F. Having been called
Froozy, Frizzy, Fiorucci, and Frooz and just plain ‘Uhhhh…,’ I am highly
accommodating. I did not, however, respond to ‘Fritzy’ because there is, as far as I know,
no t in my name. The receptionist tried again, ‘Fritzy, Fritzy DumbAss.’ As I stood up to
this most linguistically original version of my name, I could feel all eyes upon me. The
room was momentarily silent as all of these sick people sat united in a moment of
gratitude for their own names. (66-67)
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Instead of angrily presenting the receptionist as ignorant or ethnocentric, Dumas’ humorous
storytelling does something far more complex: it highlights both her own sense of mortification
at being made (unwittingly) the object of laughter, and her ability to defeat that mortification by
sharing it via hilarity and showing that she can laugh it down (demonstrating relief, superiority
and incongruity). The accumulated humor is not at the expense of any individual, but is
occasioned by the situation, and the way Dumas describes it.70 In fact, just as Dumas imagines
the other patients “united” in this moment, her storytelling effectively works to unite her readers
and herself in a moment of sympathetic and shared laughter. Her ability to tell this story (at her
own expense) with humor and to laugh it off (she gets the last word and the last laugh) converts
it from an occasion of intense embarrassment to one of shared pleasure in the sudden surprise of
absurdity and the conquest of difficulty. It hence also builds community.
Dumas works strategically to win trust from her readers, so that she can credibly convey
more serious critiques and alternative perspectives. In a later chapter of Funny in Farsi, Dumas
then takes on more thorny topics: religion, politics, western imperialism, and the “greed” for
Iranian oil that has been at the heart of modern Iran’s troubles with the west. “The Ham
Amendment” begins with her father’s loves of ham, even though he is Muslim. To explain how
he obtained tinned ham (which even his wife would not touch) in Abadan, she describes how the
city was set up as a planned development by the British to drill oil, how that resulted in decades
of western exploitation of Iran, the consequent nationalization of Iran’s oil industry, the ousting
of Mossadegh “the national hero” in the 1950’s by “foreign powers behind the scene,” and how
the reinstatement of foreign oil companies under the Shah enabled a large population of Britons
and the availability of British products in Abadan (82-85). This crucial history explains the
growing resentment against the Shah (who was seen by many Iranians as a western stooge and
sell-out), which led to the Iranian Revolution in 1979; it connects the U.S. and British imperialist
interventions in Iran (unknown to most Americans) that led to the hostage crisis of 1979. She
makes her position clear, with characteristic humor: “In a perfect world, the kindergarten teacher
would have stood up before any documents were signed [with Iran] and said, ‘Time out for
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Britain. We’ll renegotiate after a nap.’ But, alas, with no teacher present to remind the
participants of the universal concept of fairness, the British applied a different universal concept,
greed” (84). The lightness of tone does not diminish the seriousness of the point, while the
incongruity—comparing international governmental deals with kindergarten bullying—induces a
shift of perspective to make clear the self-aggrandizing moves of power.
In so doing, Dumas also pays tribute to her father’s wisdom and blend of secularism with
respect for religion. Young Firoozeh is horrified when she learns in religion class that her father’s
penchant for ham destined him to “a very bad place for a very long time” (86). When he realizes
how distressed she is, her father switches from amusement to gentle counter-instruction:
“‘Firoozeh, when the Prophet Muhammad forbade ham, it was because people did not know how
to cook it properly and many people became sick … The Prophet, who was a kind and gentle
man, wanted to protect people from harm, so he did what made sense at the time. But now,
people know how to prepare ham safely, so if the Prophet were alive today, he would change that
rule.’” Such exemplary application of reason is perhaps why this entire chapter, which Dumas
describes as the “soul of [her] book,” was the only one to be cut from the Persian translation by
the Iranian censor.71 She quotes her father’s different religious (and life) instructions: “‘it’s not
what we eat or don’t eat that makes good people; it’s how we treat one another. As you grow
older, you’ll find that people of every religion think they’re the best, but that’s not true. There are
good and bad people in every religion. Just because someone is Muslim, Jewish, or Christian
doesn’t mean a thing. You have to look and see what’s in their hearts. That’s the only thing that
matters, and that’s the only detail God cares about” (87). As the center of many of her funniest
stories, her father is treated with irreverent affection and deep respect. In her Afterword to Funny
in Farsi, Dumas notes that he became “the main character,” though when she began writing she
“had no idea he would figure so prominently” (191). In a 2008 interview with NPR, Dumas says,
“My father is a storyteller. And he is actually the funniest person that I know. I never ever grew
up thinking that I was even remotely funny. … I wanted my children to know my stories just like
I knew my father’s stories.” Funny in Farsi concludes with a final tribute to Dumas’ parents for
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their support and good-humored reception of her work, crediting her father as a source and
audience of her stories (189-98). By centering self-reflexively on the familial, Dumas’ work also
extends the notion of family to her readers, as a community literally made, cemented by the
sharing of stories and inclusive laughter.
The Greater Edginess of Laughing Without an Accent
Laughing Without an Accent is a sequel to Funny in Farsi, with similar “humorous
vignettes, verbal snapshots of [her] immigrant family,” but expanded to include more stories of
Duams’ childhood in Iran and adulthood in the U.S. after marriage and three children (4). Despite
the lacing of humor, some of these pieces, written under the threat of imminent war between the
U.S. and Iran, seem more edgy, more critical of American policies and culture, as if, having
established her credibility in her first memoir, Dumas feels confident to speak more openly. It
includes several uproarious chapters, such as “The Jester and I,” describing how she and her
French husband met as college students at Berkeley’s International House, or “’Twas the Fight
Before Christmas,” describing how her parents love her French husband but not his cooking, and
bicker with each other. Other chapters carry more incisive critiques.
In “Eight Days a Week,” for instance, Dumas compares the educational systems of
prerevolutionary Iran and the contemporary U.S. In the former, unlike the latter, she notes,
children learned work, discipline, respect, organization, time-management, appreciation for
academic excellence, and read an eclectic range of world literature and philosophy. Lauding her
American second grade teacher as exceptional, Dumas questions the American expectation that
learning be always “fun,” and homework minimal. Why, she asks, are kids who do well in school
“called nerds and geeks and dorks? This may be the only country where people make fun of the
smart kids. Now that’s stupid. I only hope that the engineer who built the bridge I drive across or
the nurse who administers our vaccines or the teacher who teaches my kids was a total nerd”
(52). Dumas continues her trademark humor and vivid concreteness to make her points, but her
goal seems more ambitious, to make an active intervention--as in this case, to ask her readers to
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think about education with a global perspective. For contemporary American readers, this is itself
an education; for young Iranian ones, a reminder that pre-revolutionary Iran was different.
In “Victoria’s Hijab,” Dumas takes on the controversial issue of veiling to make nuanced
but strong educational points through humor. Noting how glad she is that her twelve-year old
does not have to wear a hijab, “the headscarf mandatory for all women in present-day Iran” and
can choose her own future (200), she punctures her imagined American readers’ complacency
about putative American freedoms as she shifts to a feminist mother’s critique of American
consumer and media culture: “raising a daughter in this culture is a challenge for which no
human is fully prepared” (202). She explores the significance of the difficulty of buying teenage
clothes in the U.S.: “I sunbathe topless in France and celebrate the human body in all its shapes
and sizes, but why are the offerings at malls preparing our daughter for careers at Hooters? …
I’m all for consumer freedom, but I don’t see the freedom when there are no alternatives. What
happened to play clothes and girls dreaming of becoming astronauts?” (201). Commenting on hip
hop music videos and teenage icons like Lindsay Lohan and Britney Spears, she points out the
contradiction of American rhetoric and practice: “In a country where women are told they can be
anything they want to be, popular culture tells them that the lower the bar is set, the cooler you
are” (203). She describes her sister-in-law, who grew up in Iran having to wear a hijab:
“She is one of the most independent, outspoken women I know. She’s typical of Iranian
women. Wearing the hijab does not mean that women are submissive and weak. Au
contraire. The majority of Iranian women are strong and smart, defying the rules set by
the totalitarian government every chance they get. I wish to see the day when no woman
is forced to wear a hijab, chador, or burqa, but let us not discount the women underneath
those mandatory coverings. If empowerment were as simple as being able to show skin,
Paris Hilton would be the most enlightened woman in the United States. Having freedom
does not automatically mean we make good choices. Freedom is a rope: some make a
ladder out of it and climb out of the box they’re put in; some make a noose; others make a
stripper’s pole” (204).
Dumas forcefully deconstructs, with levity, serious western misconceptions concerning the veil,
Muslim women’s oppression, and putative western women’s liberation, noting how the
hegemony of the fashion industry and sexualization of children can produce its own
choicelessness.72 She makes clear her critical stance towards both the Iranian regime that denies
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women choice and the self-righteous western assumptions that cast others as inferior while
remaining blind to their own forms of gender oppression. Demonstrating incongruity, relief and
pushback against oppressive dominant western arrogance, Dumas’ humor again works with, not
against, her goals, sweetening the pill, enabling her American readers to hear what she says.
Throughout Laughing, laughter remains a constant, and becomes a subject in itself, as a
tool of survival, a builder of community, a signifier of adaptation and change. In a moving
chapter, “Seyyed Abdullah Jazayeri,” Dumas pays tribute to her uncle upon his death at ninety,
describing his achievements as an immigrant from Iran, his love of books, gardening and family,
warm sense of humor, and terrible sense of direction. Then, she adds humorously: “If there’s one
thing that separates Middle Easterners from Westerners, it’s the way we mourn. We can outmourn anyone. For many in the Middle East, a highly emotional funeral is proof that the
deceased is missed. Jackie Kennedy’s stoicism after the death of her husband would not have
translated well in the Middle East” (154). Contrary to this tradition of spectacular grieving,
however, the extended family of six hundred, spread over the U.S. and Europe, gathers to
celebrate his life, and to her surprise, in addition to the speeches and slide show, join in laughter
as her cousin remembers how his father learnt to play the flute (very badly) at age seventy, and
missed the birth of his son because he got lost driving to the hospital: “And that is when I heard
something I never thought I would hear at an Iranian memorial service: laughter… [eventually]
the audience roared. I couldn’t believe my ears” (157-58). This becomes a measure of how far the
family has come. For a six-hundred member multi-generational cross-continental extended
family, the laughter becomes a warm celebration of a beloved family elder, an occasion of unity
and community as they all remember him with love, a mode of sharing and overcoming grief,
and finally, a marker of immigrant achievement:
My uncle, along with the rest of my family, came to America seeking a better a life. Like
so many immigrants before us, we found not only what we wanted but a few things we
didn’t even know we were looking for: Girl Scouts, freedom of speech, affordable
community colleges, guacamole, public libraries, clean bathrooms, the pursuit of
happiness, and Loehmann’s. Of course we also found a few things we didn’t like:
marshmallows, the Hilton sisters and all their friends, the lack of interest in geography, …
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tomatoes that taste like cardboard. Regardless of the influences, we swore we would live
in this country but never change. We were wrong. America changed us, in ways we didn’t
realize. Oddly enough, we also changed America. We expanded the palates of many
friends to include tadig, joojeh kabob, and desserts made with rose water. … And if
there’s one thing that I hope we Iranians have imparted, it is the closeness of extended
family, not because we all get along perfectly, but because we know that we all benefit
emotionally from maintaining those ties.” (159-60)
Dumas’ incongruous, tongue-in-cheek list is at once designed to evoke laughter and make a selfreflexive point. Their laughter highlights both how immigrants change and are changed.
Conclusion: Humor as Bridge-Building
Dumas’ writing does not undertake radical critique. Her stories concern mostly secular,
educated, westernized, urban professionals who left behind privileges (like having servants) in
Iran to resettle in the U.S. Critics may object that her memoirs display an assimilationist strategy,
asking for belonging on the basis of sameness, not difference. Much of her argument that Iranians
are not as other as the western media makes them out to be is based on the attempt to
demonstrate similarity with a middle class American readership. That leaves little room for those
Iranians or Muslims who may remain other, or become more othered if they do not fit this
demographic because of their less privileged class status or more visible religious practices.
While recognizing these problems, I suggest a few ways to address them. First, while
Dumas emphasizes the underlying sameness of all humans, she does not do so by eliminating
religious-cultural differences. As shown above, her work revels in continuous references to
Iranian food, religion, history, cultural practices, and family rituals that emphasize the cultural
distinctiveness and specificities of Iranians and Iranian Americans as an ethnic group in the U.S.,
and hence the recognition of difference-in-sameness. So it does not propose a generalized
sameness, but rather, difference in sameness, or both sameness and difference, in order to
counter the pernicious dominant rhetoric of irreconcilable or unbridgeable differences. In an Oped, Dumas comments:
My people need a TV show. … My family, and most Middle Eastern immigrants I know,
spend their time working, studying, and yes, trying to lose weight. We’re not terrorists.
We’re not very Muslim. (I have some Christian friends who attend church every day, and
others who just eat chocolate bunnies on Easter. My family is the Muslim equivalent of
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the bunny eaters. A TV [sitcom] would make this obvious point obvious: Middle
Easterners come in all shapes, sizes and belief levels, just like every other kind of
American.)73
It is itself telling that Dumas feels she has to say this, to establish her legitimacy in the U.S. by
citing her non-religiosity, harmlessness, Christian friends, and Muslim equivalence through those
friends. While it certainly presents her family as the secular “Muslim equivalent,” her humorous
analogy opens up space for other kinds of Muslim immigrants, with different “belief levels,”
implying that they too are “normal,” like the range of Christians in America. She does not claim
to represent all Muslims (no memoirist can), but asks readers to understand heterogeneity.
Second, rather than simply promote assimilation, her stories enact, I would argue, a
strategy of triple-voicedness. To American readers her humor says, “we are both like you and not
like you, and as you get used us and recognize our sameness, you’ll find our differences not that
threatening;” to her Iranian American readers, with whom she shares an understanding of the
relatively greater power of mainstream Americans, “we can share much, without having to give
up what we cherish, and acknowledge the inevitability of cultural adaptation, flexibility and
change;” and to her Iranian readers she says “Americans are as complex, varied and human as we
are.” In each case, for each kind of reader, in different ways, her work strives to break down
binarisms of us-them, enemy-friend.
Laughing Without an Accent has been criticized for its title: “It is through humor,
ultimately, that Dumas feels that people can connect on deeper, universal levels. Hence the title
suggests that when we laugh, we transcend ethnicity and nationality. While this may be true,
Dumas doesn’t seem to want to recognize that there is little to no way to hide ethnicity and
nationality (let alone accents) when we converse with one another.”74 By contrast, this essay
argues that we need to read Dumas’ humor as more subtle and constructive. Dumas does not
attempt to hide or transcend ethnic or other differences; she both highlights them and emphasizes
what humans share. The title of her second memoir continues the emphasis on shared humanity
displayed in her first: “our commonalities far outweigh our differences” (Laughing, 47). It
emphasizes that laughter, unlike speech, has no accent, that it is common to all humans and is the
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closest we have to a lingua franca, or universal language. Her title both makes visible existing
commonality and suggests that the act of laughing together can itself create commonality and
community. It would be a category mistake to treat her work as a treatise on Iran, or
Islamophobia post-9/11, and to lambast its failure to show what a historian or political scientist
might. A memoirist tells her own story, from her necessarily partial perspective, but she can
appeal to a broader audience via the engaging, affective call of humor, self-conscious reflection,
and the pull of the particular instance, retold as personal, individual experience. Dumas’
strategies of humor--exaggeration and understatement, highlighting incongruity, shifting ground
and shifting targets--have multiple cultural, psychological, emotional and cognitive effects. They
enable, as Martin reminds us, better conditions of learning (with laughter) about otherness and
about one’s own fallacious assumptions; the reduction of threat and relief from pain; a
therapeutic sense of control; and the building of community and connection through laughter that
may in turn create a greater openness to learning. Her humor seeks to build bridges, to enable
recognition of sameness and good feeling that can then lead to a greater understanding of
difference. For cultural work, that may not be a place to end, but it is a place to start.
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